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CmLDREN'S INTERESTS IN A FAMILY 
CONTEXT-A CAUTIONARY NOTE 
James G. Dwyer* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The symposium organizers have posed the question 
whether children's needs are better advanced in abuse and 
neglect cases by greater emphasis on children's interests 
standing on their own or children's interests seen in the 
context of the families in which they live. I have some 
difficulty grasping the meaning of the question-particularly 
what it means for children to have interests "standing on 
their own"-but I will respond to the question based on two 
possible interpretations. On one interpretation, it is a 
question about the scope of children's interests that judges 
should take into account in reaching a disposition in abuse or 
neglect cases. Specifically, it is a question of whether judges 
should consider a child's relationship interests; that is, what 
the effects on a child would be from altering or ending a 
relationship with parents, siblings, extended family members, 
or other persons in. the child's life. On a second 
interpretation, it is a question about how judges should define 
the content of children's interests and specifically whether 
they should assume those children have the same interests 
regardless of their family situation. Instead, should judges 
recognize that each child's interests-even those interests 
that do not maintain certain relationships-are, at least in 
part, specific to and defined by the particular family of which 
the child is a member. 
Under either interpretation, the second alternative in the 
question posed must be the correct one. That is, children's 
* Assistant Professor, University of Wyoming College of Law. Thanks to 
all of my colleagues at the University of Wyoming for their thoughtful responses 
to a presentation of an early draft of this paper. 
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needs are best served by focusing on their interests within the 
context of their families. With respect to the scope of 
children's interests, it is indisputable that children have very 
important relationship interests and that those interests can 
be adversely affected by certain kinds of attempts to stop 
abusive behavior. It would therefore be foolish, in trying to 
promote a child's welfare, not to consider those interests. 
Ideally, courts should, whenever possible, end abuse by 
improving, not ending, parent-child relationships, while also 
preserving the child's relationships with other persons who 
are important in their lives. In addition, children have an 
interest simply in being part of a family, independent of the 
particular individual relationships this entails/ because being 
a member of a family creates a sense of belonging and human 
connectedness, best prepares a person to enter into 
relationships as an adult, and is "normal"-a characteristic of 
no little importance to children. Judges should also consider 
this important aspect of a child's relationship interests in 
rendering a disposition. Foster care is unlikely to satisfy 
these interests, and even when children are adopted, it may 
take considerable time before they come to see a new, 
adoptive family as "their" family. 
With respect to how children's interests should be 
defined, it is indisputable that families are not generic, and 
there is no good reason to try to make them generic. Judges 
should take as a given that different sets of parents have 
different cultural practices, values, and personalities, and 
recognize that these differences may partly determine what 
the state should deem best for any particular child. Thus, for 
example, in a case in which the goal is to "rehabilitate" 
parents charged with abuse or neglect, the judge or child 
protective agency structuring the rehabilitation ideally 
should consider such things as the capacities of the parents 
involved, which strategies those parents are likely to perceive 
as most threatening to their role as parent or to their chosen 
way of life, and whether certain mandated changes in a 
child's life might, given the child's existing perception of the 
world through the lens of family and community life, be an 
unhealthy confusion or psychological conflict for the child. 
The child's situation calls for tailor-made solutions, not a one-
1. I am indebted to Brad Saxton for this point. 
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size-fits-all approach to intervention. 
Having concluded that under either of two 
interpretations of the question posed the answer is 
straightforward and unlikely to generate disagreement, I 
offer a few cautionary observations about viewing children's 
interests in the context of their family relationships. These 
observations can be grouped into two sets. The first set 
reflects beliefs that jurisprudence relating to parent-child 
relationships is, for the most part, not child-centered; that 
entrenched attitudes about child-rearing present a great 
obstacle to moving the legal system toward a child-centered 
jurisprudence and away from the current, adult-centered 
jurisprudence; and that in light of those attitudes, loose talk 
about "children in the family" can easily lead to slippage from 
a focus on the interests of children to a focus on the interests 
of adults. The second set of observations arises from a 
perception that the assertions of judges and commentators 
about children's relationship interests are often overly 
simplistic, ignoring important differences across situations 
and over the course of a child's life. I will suggest certain 
distinctions that should be made in that context, but are 
frequently not made. 
II. THE RHETORIC OF CHILD PROTECTION 
The first set of observations relates to a concern that a 
certain danger inheres in practice with recommending to 
judges that they look at children's interests in the context of 
their family situation, or recommending that judges look at a 
family as a whole, with the aim of improving the functioning 
of "the family." The danger is that such an exhortation will 
exacerbate an existing tendency of judges in abuse and 
neglect proceedings, indeed, in any proceedings regarding 
parent-child relationships, to focus on the adults involved 
rather than the children. From my experience representing 
children and parents in family court proceedings, and from 
reading innumerable judicial opinions concerning the law 
governing child-rearing, I have formed the impression that in 
all kinds of cases posing a conflict between parents and the 
state, judges' primary concern is with the rights and 
preferences of parents rather than with the interests of 
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children.2 The rights and preferences of parents may coincide 
to some degree with the interests of children, but rarely do so 
perfectly and often do so very little. 
What seems to happen in abuse and neglect cases, 
specifically, is that judges decide cases in large part on the 
basis of some, often unconscious, judgment about the overall 
moral worth, attractiveness, or deservingness of the parents 
2. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.s. 584 (1978) (upholding state statute 
allowing parents to commit children to psychiatric hospital without adversary 
hearing, emphasizing the historical tradition of "parental autonomy" and 
discounting the possibility of a conflict of interests between parent and child); 
New Life Baptist Church Academy v. Town of E. Longmeadow, 666 F. Supp. 
293, 318-19 (D. Mass. 1987) (holding that requiring state approval of all private 
schools, and basing approval in part on qualifications of teachers, violated 
parents religious free exercise rights, because giving the state power to ensure 
that all children become intellectually autonomous would conflict with the 
fundamental interest of parents '"to guide the religious future and education of 
their children."'); Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486 (Cal. 1986) (reversing order 
of custody to father based in part on fact that father had remarried and the 
step-mother would be at home to provide constant care, because such a basis 
"suggests an insensitivity to the role of working parents" and would be "unfair" 
to the mother, who had previously been the primary caretaker); In re D.L.E., 
614 P.2d 873, 874 (Colo. 1980) (holding that parent was entitled as a matter of 
free exercise of religion to refuse to provide treatment for child's seizures absent 
imminent danger to the child's life); State v. Kaimimoku, 841 P.2d 1076 (Haw. 
1992) (reversing child abuse conviction of man who repeatedly slapped and 
punched his daughter, based on a conclusion that the father's purpose was to 
punish misconduct (the daughter's swearing at the father for verbally abusing 
his wife) and not to inflict serious physical injury, and giving no consideration to 
the well-being or rights of the daughter); In re John Doe and Jane Doe, 638 
N.E.2d 181 (Ill.), cert. denied 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994) (holding that best interests of 
three year old adopted child are irrelevant to determination of his custody 
following nullification of adoption, in an opinion dominated by discussion of 
which set of adults-the adoptive parents or the biological parents-was more 
at fault for the biological father's non-involvement in the initial adoption 
proceeding); Jarrett v. Jarrett, 400 N.E.2d 421 (Ill. 1979) (upholding post-
divorce transfer of custody to father solely because mother's cohabiting with a 
boyfriend was immoral); Dalli v. Board of Educ., 267 N.E.2d 219, 222-23 (Mass. 
1971) (analyzing religious exemption to child immunization law entirely in 
terms of rights of parents who wanted their children not to be immunized but 
were not covered by the exemption, and urging these parents to petition the 
state legislature for a broader exemption); Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152 
(Iowa), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 949 (1966) (awarding custody of child to maternal 
grandparents rather than father following death of mother "based upon his 
Bohemian approach to fmances and life in general"); Ostermiller v. Spurr, 1998 
WL 850267 (Wyo. Dec. 18, 1998) (upholding trial court order that four-year old 
child have normal visitation with, and adopt last name of, a father the child had 
never seen, based on evidence that the father now "wants to enjoy a relationship 
with the child, has a suitable residence, stable home and regular employment 
for that purpose"). 
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involved,3 rather than simply a judgment about the parents' 
capacity to fulfill specific needs of their children. They begin 
with a strong presumption of parental deservingness based 
on the constitutionally protected rights that parents are 
understood to hold.4 A judge's ultimate conclusion about the 
3. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 763 (1982). ("Permanent neglect 
proceedings employ imprecise substantive standards that leave determinations 
unusually open to the subjective values of the judge. . .. Because parents 
subject to termination proceedings are often poor, uneducated, or members of 
minority groups, such proceedings are often vulnerable to judgments based on 
cultural or class bias."). In custody cases, the backward-looking "primary 
caretaker" consideration, even though it may be a somewhat reliable predictor 
of which custodial arrangement is best for a child, but see David Chambers, 
Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. 
REV. 477 (1984) (discussing empirical evidence as to connection between which 
parent was the primary caretaker in the past and which custodial arrangement 
would be best for a child in the future), in practice is frequently treated, and in 
scholarship is often discussed, as a reward for the parent who has sacrificed the 
most for the child in the past. See, e.g., Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486 (Cal. 
1986) (stating that an assumption that a working mother cannot provide 
adequate care for a child, relative to a father's non-working new spouse, would 
be "unfair when, as here, the mother has in fact been the primary caretaker"); 
Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981) (holding that the parent who 
was the primary caretaker in the past is to receive custody absent a showing 
that she is unfit, based in part on the perception that the primary caretaker will 
feel more intensely "the terrible prospect of losing the child"); Martha Fineman, 
Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child 
Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARv. L. REV. 727 (1988) (arguing that a primary 
caretaker presumption should apply in all custody disputes between parents). 
See also Scott Altman, Should Child Custody Rules Be Fair?, 35 U. LOUISVILLE 
J. FAM. L. 325 (1997) (arguing that rules in several areas of the law governing 
children's lives compromise children's interests to some degree in order to 
achieve what is perceived as fairness to parents). 
4. See, e.g., In re Jeffrey S., 1998 WL 879652, *13 (Ohio App.) ("[A] parent's 
right to due process as a result of his or her fundamental right to raise his or 
her children must be protected."); In re Henderson, 1997 WL 752633, *5 (Ohio 
App.) ("As a parent, appellant has a right to due process as a result of his 
fundamental right to raise his child."); In re Shane "00", 664 N.Y.S.2d 113, 114 
(N.Y. 1996) ("Due process requires that [a parent] at least be afforded an 
opportunity to put [the state child protective agency] to its proof, and to 
challenge its purported justification for refusing to relinquish custody before 
being deprived of his fundamental right to raise his son."); J.P. v. Marion 
County Office of Family and Children, 61;>3 N.E.2d 1026, 1031 (Ind. 1995) ("[T]he 
courts of this state have long and consistently held that the right to raise one's 
children is essential, basic, more precious than property rights, and within the 
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution."); 
In re Howard, 382 So.2d 194, 198 (La. 1980) ("The right or interest at issue in 
an abuse/neglect proceeding is the right of a parent to custody and control of his 
or her child."); Brown v. Guy, 476 F. Supp. 771, 773 (D. Nev. 1979) ("A parent's 
right to the companionship, care, custody and control of their children is 
fundamental. "). 
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parents' deservingness in a particular case, however, may not 
hi!ad to the same outcomes as would a focus on the interests of 
the children whose needs are going unsatisfied, and a 
narrower examination of the parents in terms of their ability 
to satisfy the children's interests. 
The tendency to decide by focusing on parents, rather 
than on the interests of children, can skew results in either 
direction. If a judge is repulsed by a particular parent for 
reasons unrelated to the parent's ability to provide for the 
welfare of the child, dispositions may be punitive rather than 
designed primarily to do what is best for the child. 5 A judge 
may be repulsed not only by what the state has accused the 
parent of doing, but also by the parents' appearance 
(including race), demeanor, social class, and general way of 
life (e.g., whether they are employed or on welfare, whether 
they use drugs, whether they are sexually promiscuous). 
Others have remarked on this phenomenon in the specific 
contexts of racial and class prejudice; they have asserted that 
some judges consciously or unconsciously perceive parents 
who are poor or who are members of certain racial minorities 
as inherently less able parents, or simply less deserving 
human beings.6 My perception is that the phenomenon is 
broader, and that there is some tendency of judges to make 
judgments about the overall moral worth or attractiveness of 
parents based on other characteristics or observed behaviors 
that may not be inherently related to the interests of 
children. 
Peggy Cooper-Davis has demonstrated that certain 
psychological factors may skew results in favor of overly 
aggressive intervention in abuse and neglect cases-for 
example, a judge's fear of being responsible for harm to a 
child left unprotected, out of both a genuine moral concern for 
the welfare of children and a concern for public criticism of a 
5. Cf Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.s. 18, 39 (1981) 
("forced dissolution of the parent-child relationship has been recognized as a 
punitive sanction by courts, Congress, and commentators."). 
6. See, e.g., Douglas E. Cressler, Requiring Proof Beyond a Reasonable 
Doubt in Parental Rights Termination Cases, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 785, 
809-811 (1994) (regarding race, social class, and other bias factors); Dorothy E. 
Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHIC. L. REV. 209, 267-68 (1995) (regarding 
racial prejudice); Note, The Other 'Neglected' Parties in Child Protective 
Proceedings: Parents in Poverty and the Role of Lawyers Who Represent Them, 
66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2285 (1998). 
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failure to intervene.7 However, there are also very strong 
pulls in the direction of non-intervention. While judges are 
likely to come from a different social class than the parents 
they are judging, judges will have some tendency to identify 
with the parents simply because the judges are also adults 
and often parents. I suspect no judge would deny that he or 
she is influenced by sympathy for any parents who are in 
danger of losing their children. In addition, the impact of 
doctrine and public discourse about parental rights should 
not be underestimated, as they create a tremendous legal and 
attitudinal obstacle to termination of a parent-child 
relationship and indeed to any interference with parental 
freedom.s The impact is likely to vary from judge to judge, 
depending on his or her political and moral outlook. But it is 
fair to say that the belief that parents have a presumptive 
entitlement to be left alone, which is forfeited only when their 
conduct is truly egregious or their judgment in child-rearing 
is way outside the bounds of reasonableness (itself a very 
permissive (and amorphous) standard), generally has a strong 
hold on the judiciary, just as it does on the public.9 Whether 
or not one endorses this belief in parental entitlement,10 one 
must concede that the belief encourages a focus on parents 
and on whether the parents have forfeited their entitlement, 
in proceedings that are supposed to be child protective 
proceedings. 
The fact that only 
constitutionally protected 
proceedings encourages a 
parents, not children, have 
rights in child protective 
focus on the parents for an 
7. See Peggy Cooper-Davis and Gautam Barua, Custodial Choices for 
Children at Risk: Bias, Sequentiality, and the Law, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. 
ROUNDTABLE 139 (1995). 
8. See, e.g., Hendry v. Marion County Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 616 N.E.2d 
388, 391 (Ind. 1993) ('''[A] parent has a fundamental right to raise her child 
without undue interference by the state, and the parent-child relationship 
includes a parent's right to have unrestrained custody of her child."'). 
9. See, e.g., Reed v. Dillard, 652 A.2d 18, 26 (Del. 1995) ("[The child's] 
interests [in termination proceedings] are circumscribed by the competing 
constitutional rights of her biological parents. While the State may intervene in 
that relationship, it may do so only on clear and convincing evidence that the 
parent has forfeited the parental entitlement."). 
10. For arguments that such a belief is misguided, see JAMES G. DWYER, 
RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS V. CHILDREN'S RIGHTS (1998) [hereinafter DWYER, 
RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS] and James G. Dwyer, Parents'Religion and Children's 
Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of Children's Rights, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1371 
(1994). 
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additional reason, and that is simply that the natural 
starting point for a legally-trained mind is with the rights of 
parties to a dispute. The now rejected coverture law regime, 
which conferred rights principally on the husband in a 
marital relationship, had the same effect with respect to 
spousal abuse. ll What a judge would ask, if such a problem 
ever found its way to the courthouse, was not what was best 
for the wife or what her preferences were or what resources 
she had for self-help, but rather whether the husband was so 
reprehensible that he should be deemed to have forfeited his 
right to the unfettered rule of the home .. 
The legal standards for termination of parental rights, 
predicated on parental entitlement, also invite a focus on the 
parents. While states are beginning to add a "best interests 
of the child" requirement to termination prOVISIons, 
historically the only standard has been whether parents' 
behavior was sufficiently egregious or whether a parent was 
minimally "fit.,,12 And even in states where today a best 
interests finding is required, that determination is made only 
after the court makes a judgment about how reprehensible 
the parents are; it is an additional requirement for 
termination, not a substitute basis sufficient in itself to 
terminate.13 In some states, child protective workers may not 
11. See Honorable Pamela M. Macktaz, Domestic Violence: A View from the 
Bench, 6 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 37, 37-38 (discussing judicial 
treatment of domestic violence under the common law coverture regime and 
quoting State v. Black, 60 N.C. 162, 163 (Win. 1864): 
Id. 
[Tlhe law permits [a manl to use towards his wife such a degree of force 
as is necessary to control an unruly temper and make her behave 
herself; and unless some permanent injury be inflicted, and there be an 
excessive use of violence, or such a degree of cruelty as shows that it is 
inflicted to gratify his own bad passions, the law will not invade the 
domestic forum, or go behind the curtain. 
12. See, e.g., J.K.C. v. Fountain County Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 470 N.E.2d 
88, 93 (Ind. 1984) ("Children are not removed from the custody of their parents 
because there is a better place for them, but because the situation while in the 
custody oftheir parents is wholly inadequate for their survival."); In re J.P., 648 
P.2d 1364, 1366 (Utah 1982); Sheppard v. Sheppard, 630 P.2d 1121, 1128 (Kan. 
1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 919, 102 S. Ct. 1274, 71 L.Ed.2d 459 (1982) ("[Tlhe 
right of ... a parent to custody of the child cannot be taken away in favor of a 
third person, absent a finding of unfitness on the part of the parent."). 
13. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-112 (West 1998); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 39.802, 39.806 (West 1998); MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 712A.19b; 
VERNON'S ANN. Mo. STAT. § 211.447 (West 1998); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-292; S. 
CAR. STAT. § 20-7-768 (West 1999); S. DAK. COD. LAws § 26-8A-26 (West 1999); 
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even order services for parents and their child absent a 
showing of severe harm to the child.14 
In practice, the focus on adults fostered by attributing 
rights only to them and by basing termination decisions 
primarily or solely on an assessment of the parents, is made 
easier by the fact that abused and neglected children are 
typically out of sight during court proceedings.15 The children 
ordinarily do not attend the court proceedings or appear 
before the judge in any other setting. In addition, the 
children's attorneys typically playa far less active role than 
do attorneys of the parents and the state. The fact that the 
children are out of sight must make it more difficult for 
judges to keep them in mind. .In contrast, the judge comes 
face to face with the parent in the courtroom, and it is the 
parent and his or her attorneys with whom the judge must 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-113 (West 1999); VA. STAT. § 16.1-283 (West 1999). 
See also In re G.D. Jr. & C.D., 894 P.2d 1278, 1284 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ("[Ilt is 
unconstitutional to terminate a parent's rights based upon a finding of the best 
interest of the child without first finding that the parent is below some 
minimum threshold of fitness."); In re Kristina L., 520 A.2d 574, 582 (R.1. 1987) 
("Absent a finding of unfitness, the natural parents' right to bear and raise their 
child in a less than perfect way remains superior to the rights of foster parents 
who may be exemplary nurturers."); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 
(1982). 
[Tlhe private interest affected-weighs heavily against use of the 
preponderance standard at a state-initiated permanent neglect 
proceeding. We do not deny that the child and his foster parents are 
also deeply interested in the outcome of that contest. But at the 
factfinding stage of the New York proceeding, the focus emphatically is 
not on them. The factfmding does not purport-and is not intended-
to balance the child's interest in a normal family home against the 
parents' interest in raising the child. Nor does it purport to determine 
whether the natural parents or the foster parents would provide the 
better home. Rather, the factfmding hearing pits the State directly 
against the parents. The State alleges that the natural parents are at 
fault. . .. Victory by the State ... entails a judicial determination that 
the parents are unfit to raise their own children. 
Santo sky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982). 
14. See, e.g., McHencry v. Bartholomew County Dept. of Public Welfare, 581 
N.E.2d 948, 953 (Ind. 1991) (disapproving of child protective intervention to 
stop excessive punishment of teenage girl, and stating that "[Ilntervention is 
not justified unless the punishment seriously impairs or endangers the child's 
emotional or physical well-being."). 
15. See Jessica Liebergott Hamblen and Murray Levine, The Legal 
Implications and Emotional Consequences of Sexually Abused Children 
Testifying as Victim-Witnesses, 21 LAw & PSYCHOL. REV. 139, 159-166, 172 
(1997) (noting that few children testify in criminal child abuse proceedings and 
describing numerous studies that revealed only a small minority of abused 
children testify in court). 
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principally come to terms in rendering a decision. Children 
left unprotected do not complain, and they do not vote. And 
the public rarely becomes aware of children who continue to 
be abused because the courts failed to take appropriate steps 
to protect them. In contrast, every disgruntled parent is a 
disgruntled voter, as are the parent's relatives and friends, 
and public outcry against an inappropriate intervention is 
probably at least as loud and frequent as public outcry 
against inappropriate non-intervention.16 
If this impression of how judges make decisions in abuse 
and neglect cases is accurate, then it would be a step in the 
right direction if judges began their evaluation by considering 
what is best for the child, rather than by looking first and 
foremost at the parents and the parents' interests and rights. 
Of course, in examining the interests of a child, the court 
ultimately must consider whether the chilq's current parent 
or parents can satisfy those interests, and that requires 
making some judgment about the parents. I am simply 
recommending that this judgment be limited to the parents' 
ability to satisfy certain interests of the children, rather than 
constituting an overall evaluation of the parents' moral 
worth, deservingness, or attractiveness as human beings, or 
an assessment of whether the parents have forfeited their 
entitlement to undisturbed governance of their children. In 
addition, sympathy for parents has no place in child 
protective proceedings, any more than sympathy for abusive 
husbands has a place in proceedings to protect abused wives. 
A truly child-centered jurisprudence would mean that the 
focus of legal and moral attention is entirely on the well-being 
of the abused or neglected child. 
Because I believe judges all too frequently focus on the 
adults involved rather than on the children, and base their 
dispositions, at least partly, on how much sympathy they 
have for the parents, I am wary of any recommendation that 
judges focus on "the family," even if the idea is supposed to be 
that they focus on the family only in relation to the child's 
interests. I am wary because of the meaning and effect of 
modern rhetoric regarding the family.17 It is common for 
16. The public that would cry out is, after all, the adult public, and adults 
are at least as likely to identify and sympathize with other adults, as they are to 
identify or sympathize with children. 
17. See Twila L. Perry, Transracial and International Adoption: Mothers, 
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those who urge lesser state intervention into parent-child 
relationships to couch their arguments in terms of "protecting 
the family" or respecting "family autonomy" or "family 
rights."lB This terminology is highly problematic. 
Typically when people speak or write about protecting 
families or respecting "family autonomy" or "family rights," 
one or both of two things is going on. First, in the speaker's 
mind, though perhaps only subconsciously, the rhetoric is a 
thinly disguised call for stronger protection and freedom for 
parents, as against state efforts to protect children, motivated 
by sympathy for parents whose freedom in child-rearing the 
state has constrained.19 Second, in listeners' minds, when 
they hear the term "family autonomy" or "family rights," they 
understandably think ''parental freedom" and "parents' 
rights," just as when one hears the term "national 
sovereignty" applied to a country ruled by a despot, even a 
benevolent despot, one thinks of the despot's freedom to do 
what he wants rather than an exercise of collective will by the 
people of that country. For example, when one hears 
someone speak of "Iraq's national sovereignty," one thinks of 
Saddam Hussein doing whatever he wants. Similarly, when 
one hears "family autonomy," one thinks of parents doing 
what they want. This analogy is not intended to suggest that 
the average parent rules the family the way Hussein rules 
Iraq-though certainly some parents do. Rather, it is to 
identify a conceptual problem that arises when autonomy or 
rights are attributed to groups that do not operate on the 
basis of democratic decision-making among free and equal 
persons, and a psychological phenomenon that occurs when 
groups of that nature are discussed, namely, that reference to 
the group gets mentally translated into a reference to the 
Hierarchy, Race, and Feminist Legal Theory, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 101 
(1998) ("The language that we use in the discussion of a social issue is not 
without significance. Language not only has the effect of conveying ideas, but 
the manner in which an issue is discussed can have an impact both on the 
relationship between the parties involved in the discussion and the incentive 
these parties have to reconceptualize the issue or approach it in new ways."). 
18. See, e.g., Joan C. Bohl, Family Autonomy us. Grandparent Visitation: 
How Precedent Fell Prey to Sentiment in Herndon v. Tuhey, 62 Mo. L. REV. 755 
(1997); Emily Buss, Parents' Rights and Parents Wronged, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 431, 
440 (1996); Note, Parental Rights and Family Integrity: Forgotten Victims in 
the Battle Against Child Abuse, 18 PACE L. REV. 135, 161 (1997). 
19. These terms have also been used in an analogous fashion to advocate for 
greater protection of husbands against efforts to protect or empower wives. 
HeinOnline -- 39 Santa Clara L. Rev.  1064 1998-1999
1064 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
rulers of the group. 
To put it differently, notions of "family autonomy" and 
"family rights" are conceptually incoherent, and that 
incoherence generates confusion. Whatever sense the notions 
of group autonomy or group rights might make in other 
contexts, they make no sense in the context of the family, 
which is inherently non-democratic, at least while children 
are very young. Use of such terminology serves only to mask 
claims for greater individual rights for adults. Scholars of 
family law should, therefore, take a pledge to never use these 
terms. And while we are at it, we should also commit to 
never using the term "parental autonomy," which is not only 
conceptually incoherent, but In fact an oxymoron. 
"Autonomy" means self-rule, self-determination, and 
parenting is not self-determination; it is an "other-
determining" activity. Joining the terms "autonomy" and 
"parental" is therefore nonsensical. People use that term, just 
as they use "family autonomy" and "family rights," because it 
has greater moral purchase than does an assertion of 
"parental right" or "parental freedom," even though they all 
amount to precisely the same thing. 20 So let us call things 
what they are. It is ironic that people so commonly get away 
with using such terms in discussing child-rearing when, if 
someone today were to assert "marital autonomy," "marital 
rights," or "husband autonomy" in opposition to intervention 
to protect battered wives, he would be torn to intellectual 
shreds. We need to take the same critical stance in relation 
to the discourse surrounding child-rearing. We need to 
develop a self-conscious "critical children's theory" approach 
to family law.21 
20. See, e.g., Diane L. Abraham, California's Stepparent Visitation Statute: 
For the Welfare of the Child, Or a Court· Opened Door to Legally Interfere with 
Parental Autonomy: Where are the Constitutional Safeguards?, 7 S. CAL. REV. L. 
& WOMEN'S STUD. 125 (1997); Stephen Gilles, On Educating Children: A 
Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 937, 1004 (1996) ("[Plarents' decisions 
about which values to instill in their child involve 'choices central to personal 
dignity and autonomy."') (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
851 (1992». 
21. There are probably more apt terms than "critical children's theory," but 
I cannot think of any that are also as suggestive of a comparison with other 
critical theories. I would include many works by contemporary scholars under 
the heading of critical children's theory-works that reveal illicit attitudes 
about children underlying legal doctrine pertaining to parent-child 
relationships, e.g., Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Who Owns the Child?: Meyer 
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The upshot of this discussion of terminology is that I fear 
that encouraging judges to focus on "the family" can, 
depending on how it is expressed, exacerbate an existing 
tendency to focus on parents rather than children in abuse 
and neglect cases, and that encouraging judges to protect 
families may lead them simply to give even greater protection 
to parents. Stronger protection for parents would produce 
better results for children in some cases-namely, those 
where termination or other highly interventionist disposition 
is in fact not the best thing for the child, but where judges are 
nevertheless inclined to terminate parental rights because 
they have formed an adverse overall moral judgment of the 
parents, and this judgment is sufficient to override the 
presumption of deservingness and entitlement. But it would 
be achieving that result in the wrong way in those cases-
that is, by still focusing on the parents. And more 
importantly, in the majority of cases where courts are already 
over-protective of parents, a decision not to terminate 
parental rights out of sympathy for them, and respect for 
their legal and presumed moral rights, would lead to worse 
results for children. 
Under the second alternative interpretation of the 
question posed, I concluded above that judges ideally should 
define the content of a particular child's interests by reference 
to the specific characteristics of the child's family and 
community. 22 But this conclusion, too, suggests a danger 
inherent in making a particular recommendation to judges, 
given the adult-centered nature of family law jurisprudence. 
The danger in this context is that judges will substitute the 
parents' judgment of the child's interests for their own 
judgment-guided by statutory criteria, empirical research, 
and case-specific evidence-of the child's interests. This 
and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARy L. REV. 995 (1992); works 
that challenge assumptions about the relationship between the state and 
families and the notion that the parent-child relationship is a "private" 
phenomenon, e.g., Frances Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 
18 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 835 (1985); and works that urge recognition of new 
constitutional rights for children by challenging generally assumed 
justifications for treating children differently from adults, e.g., Susan A. 
Bitensky, Spare the Rod, Embrace Our Humanity: Toward a New Legal Regime 
Prohibiting Corporal Punishment of Children, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 353 
(1998). 
22. This may be a very difficult thing to do in practice. 
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approach obviously would make the entire child protective 
proceeding pointless. To adopt the parents' judgment is to 
abdicate the state's role of protecting children's interests, and 
to abandon a child-centered jurisprudence. It is one thing for 
the state to say that, within certain limits defined by the state 
based on the state's perception of what is best for children, 
parents should be free to act on the basis of their judgments 
as to their child's interests, because this parental freedom is, 
in the state's view, a good thing for children. It is quite 
different to say that parents are entitled to have their 
judgment of their child's interests control the outcome of an 
abuse or neglect proceeding, or any other legal dispute over 
their child's welfare. The latter position is unacceptable from 
a perspective that takes seriously the morally and legally 
distinct personhood of a child.23 
The danger, then, is that judges will understand a 
recommendation to take into account a particular parent's 
characteristics, including culture, in making a situation-
specific determination of a child's interests, as a 
recommendation to effectuate the parent's judgment, by 
adopting the parent's beliefs as the court's basis for deciding 
the outcome. The danger would be greatest where parental 
judgments appear to arise out of minority cultural practices 
and beliefs, because misunderstandings of liberal notions of 
toleration and self-determination lead many people to believe 
that the freedom the state must accord to adults in directing 
their own lives must also be given to parents in directing the 
lives of children. That the United States Supreme Court 
enshrined this fundamental misunderstanding into a 
constitutional principle in Wisconsin v. Yoder24 makes it all 
the more likely that judges will misconstrue a 
recommendation to define children's interests by reference to 
the particular families in which they live. 
What is needed, if the goal is to get courts to consistently 
make decisions in abuse and neglect cases that are in the 
child's best interests, is a way to refocus judges' attention on 
children, while still encouraging them to take into account 
that a child's interests are affected by their particular family 
23. See DWYER, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS, supra note 10. 
24. 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that the free exercise rights of Amish 
parents entitle them to keep their children out of school beyond the eighth 
grade). 
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situation and typically include interests in maintaining 
family relationships. In terms of rhetoric, the language we 
use in exhorting decision-makers to make decisions in certain 
ways, perhaps the way to do that is to not talk about 
"focusing on the family" or "protecting families," but rather to 
talk simply about "children's relationship interests," to spell 
out concretely and specifically what those interests are,25 and 
to make judges conscious of the danger of slippage, of shifting 
their focus from children's interests to parents' worth or 
attractiveness or deservingness. 
In terms of legal changes, perhaps a "best interests of the 
child" requirement should be the only requirement for 
termination of the parent-child relationship,26 just as it is, at 
least nominally, the only criterion for deciding the contours of 
children's relationships with divorcing parents. In the 
abstract, this might cause some alarm because it conjures up 
images of judges terminating parent-child relationships and 
shuffling children around based on the judges' subjective 
judgments about optimal parenting. But a "best interests" 
standard could be fleshed out in termination statutes, just as 
it is in custody provisions, to constrain judges' decisions in 
whatever ways are appropriate. 
For example, a termination provision could spell out that 
judges must make an explicit finding regarding the strength 
of a child's interest in maintaining a relationship with the 
abusive or neglectful parent and in remaining part of his or 
her current family and community. Additionally, the 
provision could direct that judges order termination of the 
parent-child relationship only if they find, based on strong 
evidence, that the anticipated future harm to the child from 
remaining in a relationship with the parent, after less severe 
measures of preventing the abuse or neglect are considered 
and perhaps attempted, outweighs the child's interest in 
maintaining the relationship. Thus, a properly constrained 
25. See infra at Part lILA. 
26. See In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1368 (Utah 1982) (holding 
unconstitutional a statute providing for termination of parental rights based 
solely on the best interests of the child, rejecting the State's argument that "'any 
distinction (between the best interest and unfitness standards) is a mere matter 
of semantics,'" and determining instead that replacing an unfitness standard 
with a best interest standard "deleted a statutory protection for the parental 
rights of fit parents" and did "not provide equivalent protection for parental 
rights."). 
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"best interests of the child" analysis could subsume some of 
the requirements now embedded in a "scope of parental 
rights" analysis. But changing the analysis from an 
assessment of whether parents have forfeited their right to a 
relationship, to an assessment of what is best for the child, 
should help to refocus judges' attention on the abused or 
neglected child. 
III. A MORE REFINED UNDERSTANDING OF RELATIONSHIP 
INTERESTS 
In this section, I want to unpack the idea of children's 
relationship interests a little, and also make a point about 
parents' relationship interests. I offer the observation about 
parents' interests not because I think judges should consider 
them in child protective proceedings, but because I think 
judges do consider them and I believe a better understanding 
of what is best for an abusive parent might lessen any 
tendency not to intervene in situations of abuse and neglect 
because of sympathy for parents or solicitude for parental 
rights. 
A. The Nature and Relative Weight of Children's 
Relationship Interests 
The observation is now a familiar one that children have 
an interest, along with other, possibly contrary interests, in 
maintaining their relationships with their parents and other 
family members, including extended family and anyone with 
whom there is an intimate connection, even when there has 
been abuse by parents.27 Let us dissect this observation a bit. 
What interests, exactly, does a child have in maintaining a 
relationship with an abusive parent? 
Even in the worst cases, a child has an interest in having 
a relationship with his biological parents. Whether socially 
constructed or innate, most people appear to have a desire for 
that connection. This is manifest in the great lengths to 
which many adopted children go to find their biological 
parents. It is important to recognize, though, that in many 
cases this is the only interest a child has in a relationship 
27. The observation is often traced to the 1970s writings of Joseph 
Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert J. Solnit: Before the Best Interests of the 
Child (1979) and Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (1973). 
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with a parent. Such cases comprise at least two kinds. One 
situation where it might be true that a child's only interest in 
having a parent-child relationship is an interest in the 
biological connection is where there is no existing 
relationship. This may be the case where the child is a 
newborn or where the abusing parent has been absent from 
the family until just before the abuse occurred. The other 
situation is where there is an existing relationship with no 
positive aspects, that is, where the child receives no benefit 
from interaction with the parent. In both situations, where 
the only interest of the child that may count in favor of a 
relationship with a parent is the biological connection, there 
ought to be some basis for evaluating the importance of that 
interest, in order to determine whether it outweighs 
countervailing interests of the child. I do not know whether 
sufficient empirical work has been or could be done to inform 
that evaluation, but my perception is that courts do not look 
for such work. Instead, each judge operates on the basis of 
some amorphous and unarticulated personal intuition about 
the importance of the biological connection, and the parties 
are left guessing how much weight it received relative to 
other interests of the child. 
This question about the importance of biology arose for 
me in practice not only in abuse cases, but also in some 
custody/visitation disputes, particularly those between never-
married parents. In some cases where a parent had not 
abused the child but also had not yet formed a relationship, it 
was my judgment as guardian ad litem that the parent had so 
many problems that he was unlikely to provide anything good 
for the child in the foreseeable future and was, in fact, likely 
to do harm. Moreover, I could see that the process of trying to 
create a relationship in such situations had the potential to 
harm the child. For example, imposing on a custodial parent 
an eighteen year routine of delivering the child for visitation 
with a non-custodial parent whom the custodial parent does 
not trust could have a substantial negative effect on the 
child's life. When the custodial parent is upset, the child 
experiences stress and the custodial parent is a less effective 
care-giver. In some of these situations, I was forced to 
conclude that-biological connection aside-the child would 
be better off if he or she never developed a relationship with 
the non-custodial parent. 
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In other, more blunt terms, put in the position of having 
to recommend one way or the other about visitation with a 
non-custodial biological parent, I was sometimes forced to 
conclude that that the non-custodian was simply not qualified 
to be a parent. I then had to ask myself whether the child's 
interest just in having the connection with a biological parent 
trumped the conclusion that the biological parent was 
incapable of acting as a caretaking parent. I usually assumed 
that it did not, but I had no basis for that assumption other 
than my own intuitions. 
If someone were to object that it is more than a little 
frightening that a lawyer, someone trained in law, not the 
social sciences, would make such a judgment based on just a 
few interviews with the parties, I would not disagree. Given 
the reality of representing children in these cases, however, I 
do. not see any responsible alternative. To not make any 
judgment is simply to leave things in the hands of lawyers, 
none of whom is required to advocate exclusively for what is 
best for the child. What many attorneys representing 
children do in these situations is take a conservative 
approach and recommend modest visitation, perhaps in a 
supervised setting, for an indefinite period of time. They 
make this recommendation, in my view, not because they 
attach greater importance to the biological connection than I 
do, but because they either 1) do not wish judges or other 
attorneys to perceive them as radical, and in light of 
established law and practice a recommendation of "no 
relationship" is viewed as radical, even if it is the best 
outcome for the child, or 2) fail to take seriously their role as 
an independent advocate for the child and instead believe 
that they must defer to what they understand as the rights of 
the parent. N either of these is an appropriate basis for a 
recommendation by a guardian ad litem or attorney 
representing a child. 
In other situations, there will be both the benefit of the 
biological connection and a psychological or emotional benefit 
for the child from maintaining a relationship with an abusive 
parent. In many, perhaps most, situations, there is both a 
positive and a negative aspect to the parent-child 
relationship. In these situations, if measures other than 
termination of parental rights can succeed in ending abusive 
behavior and in assisting the parent to become a better 
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parent within a reasonable period of time, then clearly that 
should be done. It is less clear what should be done in the not 
uncommon situation where the parent cannot be 
rehabilitated, yet the child still has an interest in 
maintaining the relationship. In such cases, a balancing of 
interests would seem to be called for, one that takes into 
account the strength of the relationship and the severity of 
the abuse or neglect that is expected to continue. This 
weighing of interests should be based on the best possible 
evidence about the nature of the particular relationship at 
issue and the harm that ending it would cause the child, 
given the age, psychological and emotional state, and other 
characteristics of the particular child involved, rather than on 
generalized assumptions about the importance of continuity 
in children's lives. It is not inconceivable that that balancing 
might sometimes dictate that some harm to the child must be 
reluctantly accepted, or in other words, that some abuse must 
be tolerated (though certainly not condoned), as disquieting 
as that sounds. In addition, this interest of the child in 
maintaining a relationship despite abuse by a parent who 
cannot be rehabilitated may create a preference for certain 
kinds of placement if termination is necessary-for example, 
the increasingly common practice of foster care or adoption by 
relatives. 
B. The Flip-Side of the "Unity of Interests" Anthem 
Having said that courts should not focus on the adults 
involved in abuse and neglect cases, I want nevertheless to 
make a point about parents' interests that I think is generally 
overlooked. It is the obverse of the observation that parent 
and child share an interest in avoiding unwarranted 
intervention. Just as it once may have been common for 
judges and child welfare workers to think that all of an 
abused child's interests point in favor of intervention, and to 
overlook the fact that intervention can entail costs for the 
child, I believe it still common for judges and others to make 
the mistake of thinking that all of a parent's interests point in 
favor of non-intervention. The mistake derives from thinking 
that parents' typical expression of what they want-to be left 
alone, is actually what is best for them. 
I am going to go out on a limb and suggest that parents 
do not benefit from being able to abuse their children. To the 
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contrary, all human beings benefit from having healthy 
relationships with others, and particularly from having 
healthy, loving relationships with family members. I doubt 
that anyone conceives of abusing one's children as an aspect 
of human flourishing. In addition, a parent who alienates his 
children by maltreating them is a parent who, after the 
children are grown, must live with the pain of a hostile or 
discontinued relationship with his children. Thus, where 
parents' impulses toward abusive conduct are destroying 
their relationship with their children, the parents themselves 
would benefit from intervention that can help them get on a 
different track, a track that leads to a mutually rewarding 
relationship with their offspring. 
It is therefore a mistake, I think, to view state 
intervention in abuse situations as always "for" the child and 
"against" the parent. Parents share with children an interest 
in receiving appropriate state intervention. Even where 
termination is necessary to protect the child's interests, the 
parent might also be better off on the whole, because that 
outcome might create a possibility that would not otherwise 
exist for a relationship after the child is grown. The child 
might reinitiate contact with the parent later in life, 
harboring less hostility to the parent than he or she would 
have if the abuse had continued throughout childhood. 
Believing this to be the case, when I represented parents 
in child protective proceedings, I would sometimes talk to 
them about what they wanted in the long-run in terms of a 
relationship with their children, about how what they were 
doing might prevent their achieving that objective, and about 
what they might do, in cooperation with child protective 
workers, to accomplish their aim. I would encourage them to 
see that accepting some services might actually be the best 
thing for them, in terms of their long-term goals for their 
relationship with their children. Of course, accepting services 
can also be a way to get the state to agree to suspend the 
legal proceedings, so encouraging parents to accept services 
was not inconsistent with helping them satisfy their desire 
simply to avoid an adjudication of abuse or neglect or to avoid 
termination proceedings. But it gives the attorney an 
additional and entirely legitimate reason to recommend to the 
client that he or she accept rehabilitative services, and 
perhaps a way for the parent to actually approach counseling 
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or parenting classes with a positive attitude, thereby 
increasing the likelihood of success. Ultimately, of course, a 
lawyer representing a competent adult must allow her client 
to decide what he wants his lawyer to do for him, but I found 
that many parents were capable of appreciating to some 
degree that intervention was consistent with their self-
interests, not just in avoiding a finding or disposition, but 
also in improving their relationship with their child. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Judges who decide abuse and neglect cases should view 
the child as a member of a family, not as an isolated member 
of society. They should take into account that the child will 
always have some interest in maintaining a relationship with 
the abusive parent, and they should be aware that children's 
interests, including interests other than interests in family 
relationships, may vary depending on the unique 
characteristics of their parents and their parents' community. 
However, judges should be very self-conscious in thinking 
about children as members of families. They should not allow 
their attention to stray from the welfare of the children, and 
should be made aware of the danger of slippage occasioned by 
the parent-centered nature of family law jurisprudence. In 
addition, judges should be more discriminating in thinking 
about children's relationship interests; rather than assuming 
that the relationship interest is of the same nature and 
strength for every child, they should examine what kind of 
relationship, if any, presently exists, and what the prospects 
are for a relationship in the future. Sometimes the child's 
interest in having a relationship will be quite strong, and 
other times it may be barely significant. Lastly, while judges 
should not make decisions in child-protective proceedings 
based on sympathy for parents, judges who do sympathize 
with the parents involved can receive comfort from knowing 
that ordering parents to comply with a service plan, or even 
ordering termination of the parent-child relationship, may 
actually be the best thing for the parents, in terms of their 
relationship interests, as well as for the child. 
